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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 09/07/2011 Accident number: 729 
Accident time: 11:00 Accident Date: 17/08/2010 
Where it occurred: AF/0701/0723, MF289, 
Tandan village, Paktya 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: None 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed] 
CBDT 
 
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 09/07/2011 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
Inadequate detector pinpointing 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
1 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] CBDT-15 DMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION:  
Demining investigation team was convened by AMAC Gardez to investigate and find out the 
causes of the demining accident involving [the Victim] the deminer of [Demining group] 
CBDT-15. As this was a fatal case, so the [Demining group] site officer and QA assistant were 
also called to join the investigation process. The accident occurred around 11:00 hours, on 17 
August 2010 in Task #AF/0701/0723/MF289 located in Tandan village, centre of Paktya 
province.  
SUMMARY: 
Task #AF/0701/0723/MF289 is located in a hillside, around 13 km towards the Northwest of 
Gardez city. The anti-personnel mines were laid there by Russian forces during 1987-1992 to 
secure their positions from Mujahidin attacks. The MCPA LIAT conducted a polygon survey in 
this area in June 2009.  
Mine clearance operations started in this area by [Demining group] as a community based 
demining project and the deminers from the community recruited for this operation. On 16th 
June 2010 CBDT-15 started demining operations in mentioned mine field. They found and 
destroyed 13 anti-personnel mines and cleared 85 % of the area until the accident happened.  
On 17 August 2010 while [the Victim] was working in his clearance lane, his excavation tool 
touched a mine and caused it to go off. According to the investigation report and the injuries 
sustained by victim deminer, it seems that the de-miner has excavated a detected signal 
carelessly and in contrary to their SOP. It means signal was not pinpointed correctly and the 
de-miner had used the excavation tool directly on the top of mine, so the accident happened. 
Unfortunately the de-miner did not put his PPE on, therefore, he got severe injuries on his 
eyes, whole face, neck, chest, shoulders, arms, legs and deep wounds on his left ear. The 
deminer died in the spot. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
Carelessness of the de-miner in term of not using his PPE and visor during the operation and 
using the excavation tool directly on the top of signal is the main contributing factor to this 
accident.  
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The following points are to be considered: 
• [Demining group] operations department is recommended to come up with a 
comprehensive plan of action for the improvement of command and control in their 
demining teams especially for the CBD projects.  
• [Demining group] operations department should plan and implement revision and 
refresher trainings for their CBD projects in order to improve the deminers skills, the 
plan should be shared with MACCA operations department.  
• [Demining group] should strengthen the internal QA visits to CBD projects to find the 
shortcomings and develop the improvement plans accordingly.  
Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required to 
be submitted to the MACCA within 7 days, effective from the issue of this report. 
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 922 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Arms; severe Chest; severe Eyes; severe Face; severe Legs; severe Neck 
FATAL 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "severe injuries on his eyes, whole face, 
neck, chest, shoulders, arms, legs and deep wounds on his left ear. The deminer died in the 
spot. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim 
was working without PPE and his error was not corrected. His failure to pinpoint a detector 
reading accurately and excavate safely imply that he was inadequately trained. The 
secondary cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the investigators 
found that there was a need for improved training and command and control systems, both of 
which are the senior management’s responsibility. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years 
in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. National staff have been more responsible 
than the internationals with overall responsibility. 
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